Histories of US involvement in the First World War and those of US empire in the Americas are like estranged twins, intimately connected but strangely absent from each other's lives. Understandably, the fi rst group is focused almost exclusively on the European theatre 3. For instance, Farwell 1999 devotes only a few pages to Mexico, and no space to any other country in Latin America. 4. Grandin 2006, 30-1. 5 . For examples, see Bailey 1942, esp. ch. 10 ; Durán 1985 ; Jore 1988 ; Albert 1988 ; Siepe 1992 ; Weinmann 1994 . This scholarship to some extent refl ects the literature during and immediately after the war, celebrating Latin American republics which joined the war and disparaging those which did not : Groupement des Universités 1916 ; Contreras 1917 ; Kirkpatrick 1918 ; Gaillard 1918 ; Suárez 1918 ; Barrett 1919 . Another group of historians has focused exclusively on the Latin American-European relationship, largely excluding the United States ; see for example, Couyoumdjian 1986, and Rolland 1992. US empire have been fi xated largely on the opposite question -how the war affected the Americas, specifi cally the rising power of US trade and fi nance in the hemisphere. Their narrative is generally that of an imperial jaguar, already well perched before the war, taking advantage of European distraction and weakness to pounce on European partners in the Americas. The narrative is also largely focused on South America 6 . While that narrative is true enough, it neglects a more nuanced story of how the First World War promoted but also restrained US empire in the Americas. At the heart of this nuance is the paradox that affected the Americas as much as it did Europe : the United States entered a war alongside colonial powers in order to promote self-determination. Just as the start of war in Europe offered Washington an opportunity to expand its power in the hemisphere, it also foresaw the beginning of the end of that empire by offering, at least implicitly, the ideological foundation for democracy and independence in President Woodrow Wilson's call for national self-determination. To understand this dynamic fully, historians must take three approaches that they rarely have : fi rst, begin the narrative not, as they usually do, in 1917, when the United States entered the war, but in 1914, when Germany began to threaten the hemisphere ; second, focus on political and military rather than economic matters ; and third, take into account the voices of those living under the US empire -not the largely independent presidents of South American countries, but repressed, censored and desperate representatives of peoples directly under the US heel in the smaller countries of the Caribbean and Central America. It is these denizens of often military-occupied republics who most took to heart Wilson's entreaties on self-government and confronted them with the hypocrisy of US empire. This article makes those shifts in conceptual and methodological emphasis, made possible by research in three languages and fi ve countries.
THE WAR AS A BOON FOR US EMPIRE
In many ways the war in Europe boosted the fortunes of US empire. Economically, the United States rapidly supplanted European countries as a major exporter, banker and investor south of its border. Diplomatically, the war put unprecedented pressure on Latin American republics. And militarily, the United States occupied or acquired more territory as a result of the war, or else solidifi ed its strategic position in Central America and the Caribbean.
First, the war in Europe improved the fi nancial outlook of the United States in the Americas. Even before hostilities broke out, the USA was moving toward an empire that increasingly emphasised dollars over bullets. True, Wilson and his Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, were opposed to the controlled-loan 'dollar diplomacy' of Wilson's predecessor William Howard Taft 7 . But their opposition was to the military control that it implied, not the extension of US commercial power.
6. For examples, see Tulchin 1971 ; Black 1988 ; Rosenberg 1987 ; Langley 2002 ; Cuenca 2006 . 7. Adler 1940 As historian Joseph Tulchin has noted, priorities shifted from eliminating political instability and fi scal irresponsibility to helping US businesses dominate foreign investment, hitherto a European domain in Latin America 8 . During the First World War, the revolving door between US business and diplomacy turned ever more swiftly. The State Department was fi lled with men from a business background and with investments abroad, and they increasingly rejoined the business world after public service 9 . The relationship was so intimate that fi rms at times directly infl uenced military policy. Entrepreneur Roger Farnham, who had economic interests in Haiti, played a not unsubstantial role in scaring Wilson administration offi cials into believing tales of German, French and even unlikely German-French intrigue in the republic, and those tales led to intervention in 1915 10 . More commonly, the State Department encouraged the growth of US business in Latin America not only indirectly by organising conferences, but directly by loaning out translators, allowing the private use of offi cial cables and providing offi cial representation on behalf of corporations. The federal government also set up fi nancial, shipping and communications infrastructure or enacted legislation to encourage private growth in Latin America. The War Trade Board embargoed some foodstuffs to Cuba, which benefi ted US fi rms, and also blacklisted enemy fi rms, which allowed US interests to supplant them. Transferring German fi rms to US hands, wrote the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, was 'a good method for the development of American commerce in that region [Latin America.] The First World War encouraged empire in the Americas not only commercially but diplomatically. As a diplomatic indication of US power over its empire by the start of the war, Washington was able to marshal 8. Tulchin 1971 , 3. 9. Rosenberg 1987 , 39. 10. Schmidt 1995 , 52. 11. Coleman 1951 Rosenberg 1987, 42-4, 50, 51 (quotation), 73 . See also Kaufman 1971 . 12. Callcott 1942 , 277. 13. Adler 1940 , 208. 14. Whitaker 1954 most directly the sympathies of nations directly under its tutelage. On 3 February 1917 Wilson severed diplomatic relations with Germany, while on 6 April Congress declared war and Wilson asked that Latin American governments at least break relations with Germany. Such a request ran contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, which viewed with disfavour any hemispheric involvement in European affairs 15 . Still, only six out of 20 Latin American republics remained neutral during the war. Of the 14 that either declared war on or broke relations with Germany, two were US protectorates (Cuba and Panama), three were under military occupation (Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic) and three more were subject to either occasional marine landings or diplomatic pressure (Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras) 16 . To be sure, to argue for US pressure is not to deny that Latin American executives also considered their national interest when they responded favourably to Washington. The Haitian government held off on declaring war until a German submarine attack on the steamers Karnak and Montreal, which destroyed a great deal of cargo and killed eight Haitian citizens in early 1917.
Yet republics in the Caribbean and Central America admitted the weight of US infl uence in their decisions. Cuban President Mario García Menocal did so somewhat inadvertently in his war message, explaining that neutrality would 'be contrary to public sentiment, to the spirit of pacts and obligations, rather more moral than legal which bind us to the United States, and would eventually, because of her [Cuba's] geographical situation, be a source of inevitable confl ict [with the United States]. ' In his own war message, Haiti's Sudre Dartiguenave spoke of 'our powerful and natural ally, the United States, admirable in her lofty ideals'. 'Our indisputable duty in this tremendous hour of history is of a common ally,' echoed the president of Panama, 'whose interests and existence as well are linked indissolubly with the United States 17 .' But the least studied yet most complex impact of the war on US empire is the third, the military one. It remains under-examined because of the long saga of US military interventions before 1914. Tulchin, for instance, sees interventions in Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua as products of the pre-war, shop-worn pattern of intervention. While this is true, these interventions were nevertheless substantial, and some of them direct results of the war 18 . The Caribbean became far more strategically important as soon as the war began in Europe, and even more so when the United States joined it. The opening of the Panama Canal in August 1914 coincided with the outbreak of hostilities, and so shipping lanes became doubly vital to US security. In fi scal years 1917-19, over 5600 ships transited through the waterway. Mexican petroleum and Chilean nitrates, both vital to the Allies, passed through the Caribbean 19 . Ships steamed past some of the smallest and more vulnerable republics in Latin America, such as Cuba and Haiti, and so increased the US fear of 15. Rosenberg 1987 , 4. 16. For details, see Barrett 1919 ; see also Martin 1942 , 517. 18. Tulchin 1971 , 5. 19. Yerxa 1987 Haiti (1915-34) and the Dominican Republic (1916-24) . To be sure, US military intervention was not new on the island of Hispaniola that both republics shared. . Yet the fact remains that it was fear of European intervention that prompted the initial Marine landing. Lansing, for instance, had every intention of securing a naval base at Haiti's Môle SaintNicolas, and Navy offi cials also wanted to protect Samaná Bay in the neighbouring Dominican Republic. When the Marines took Port-au-Prince in July 1915, the French had landed days before in Cap-Haïtien to protect French property, and the US Navy immediately warned Paris and London to move no further 25 . The French backed off, saying 'that anything likely to cause diffi culties with the United States should be avoided 26 .' Fear of Germany -and particularly of German spies in occupied countries -also coloured the occupations of these two countries. The exaggeration of the German threat is clear : while there may have been German citizens under US occupation who were less than loyal to Washington, there was no evidence of any effort by Germany to co-ordinate those citizens 27 . Berlin certainly did organise political activity elsewhere in Latin America, but not in countries that the Marines occupied 28 . Yet the larger point, again, is that the Marines feared German subversion and so entrenched themselves more deeply as an imperial force. Major General Littleton Waller wrote to the Secretary of the Navy citing 20. Ibid. 21. Cabranes 1979 , 404. 22. Langley 1985 Ferguson 2004, 56. 23. Pierce and Hough 1964, 161 ; Plummer 1992 Heinl, Jr. and Heinl 1978, 431 ; Corvington 1984 , 53. 34. Munro 1980 . 'Quarterly Report of Military Government in Santo Domingo from July 1, 1918 , to September 30, 1918 ', 18 October 1918 George Thorpe, for instance, wrote in August 1918 : 'I am more than ever impressed with the seriousness of the German situation here. They think they own the earth and propose to run things to suit themselves 37 .' Thorpe partly revealed his logic by stating that 'whoever is running this revolution is a wise man : he certainly is getting a lot out of the niggers', and that therefore 'it shows the handwork (sic) of the German as certain as can be'. Thorpe offered no evidence of such leadership 38 . Nevertheless, he concluded in mid-1919 that Dominican 'insurgents were incited, supplied, and often led by Germans' and he 'imprisoned several Germans therefore 39 .' Thorpe's zeal for rooting out German infl uence, real or imagined, might also have been motivated by his desire to be sent to Europe. As he explained in August 1918, 'If I do a good job of clearing these two provinces of insurgents and kill a lot, mayn't I go to some more active fi eld of endeavor, too[ ?] It ought to demonstrate that I'd be a good Germankiller 40 .' In other words, the outbreak of war in Europe might have made things considerably worse for anti-occupation guerrillas -and more propitious for US empire -since they became stepping-stones to a greater mission for individual occupiers.
Even the Nicaraguan occupation, begun in 1912 for reasons unrelated to the war in Europe, strengthened its hold after hostilities broke out across the Atlantic. In August 1914 Secretary Bryan and General Emiliano Chamorro signed an agreement that became law when the US Senate ratifi ed it in February 1916. It gave the United States exclusive rights to two naval bases and to build any future inter-oceanic canal in Nicaragua. In return, Washington disbursed $3 million to the cash-strapped Central American nation. The goals of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty were overwhelmingly strategic. The British had up to then had an equal right to build a canal, and Germany and Japan had expressed interest 41 . The goal of keeping them out was more salient than that of building a new US canal in Nicaragua. The US collector-general of customs in Nicaragua argued that the treaty made Nicaragua 'an important link in the chain, which we are attempting to forge, of preparedness and national defense, and the protection of our investment in the Panama Canal 42 .' After all, Bryan-Chamorro was signed the same month that the Panama Canal saw the passage of its fi rst ships. Bryan had even wanted the agreement to include a US right to armed intervention in Nicaragua, though the Senate opposed it 43 
THE WAR AS A RESTRAINT AGAINST US EMPIRE
Paradoxically, the war also restrained US empire in the Americas, and this in two ways. First, by focusing US energies and ambitions largely away from Latin America, war in Europe dampened the Americans' ability to back their social engineering during occupations with the needed military backbone. Second, the very language Wilson used to shape the post-war order in Europe inspired activists in the Americas to hasten the end of what they considered a US effort to suppress their own ability to self-govern.
The war had a moderate impact on the quantity of US troops in the Caribbean. Perhaps hundreds of troops were sent from Hispaniola to France right before the United States entered the First World War, for instance 46 . The consequence for security was minor, yet the head of the Dominican occupation complained in mid-1917 that it gave the impression to insurrectionists 'that we were withdrawing before an unbeaten bandit 47 '. More important, the war harmed the quality of US imperial control by drawing away the most talented Navy offi cers. Many who were left behind felt inferior, deprived of true combat experience 48 . One complained that Marines in the Dominican Republic received a smaller 'allowance' than those in Europe 49 . Among the discontented was Smedley Butler, an offi cer whose thirst for combat remained forever unquenched, who bitterly complained of having to stay in Haiti in 1917 to lead its Gendarmerie. He requested a transfer to Europe, and got his wish to go to France, but then never saw combat there, to his chagrin 50 . Butler was 44. Rosenberg 1987 , 155. 45. Tulchin 1971 , 64. 46. McCrocklin 1956 , 1915 -1934 , RG 127, NARA I. 50. Schoultz 1998 not the only one itching to go. The French chargé d'affaires in Port-auPrince reported in 1919 that 20 US recruits, unhappy that they had been sent to Haiti, were awaiting court martial after having mutinied 51 . Anti-German paranoia, for all its impetus to empire in Latin America, also proved a drawback, because occupiers proved largely unable to appreciate the widespread opposition to their take-over. In the Dominican occupation, Lieutenant Colonel Thorpe concluded that 'unless people are lying to me to curry favor there is almost universal approval of our methods and plan. Our opposition is from Germans and pro-Germans 52 .' The descriptor 'pro-German', often used in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, became a convenient way of neglecting the real grievances of those under occupation, who criticised the Marines for taking over their institutions, dispensing justice unfairly, saddling their governments with new debts and introducing US-style racism, forced labour and torture, among other things 53 . When the war ended but 'pro-Germans' continued to resist, US offi cials were left without a true appreciation of indigenous attitudes grounded in specifi c Latin American conditions.
One cannot speak of US empire in Latin America without addressing Mexico. Mexico saw interventions, but not because of the war. On the contrary, the war prevented further interventions, and even shortened one. To be sure, before 1917 Mexico, having already been embroiled in revolution for years when the Great War broke out, suffered through Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson's connivance in the overthrow of President Francisco Madero in 1913, the occupation of Veracruz in 1914 and the 'punitive expedition' to chase down Pancho Villa in 1916-17. Yet none of these moves were consequences of the war. The only directly warrelated issue was the German proposal of a military alliance with President Venustiano Carranza in early 1917, uncovered in the Zimmermann telegram 54 . But because Wilson could not afford the troops for a Mexican invasion and preferred to pacify Carranza, he let the matter drop if the latter was indeed strict in his neutrality. Mexico found the proposed alliance untenable in any case. The need for troops for the European theatre even moved Wilson to pull out John Pershing's punitive mission without waiting for a quid pro quo from Carranza 55 . Wilson's Mexican policy, as it related to the war in Europe, was primarily one of caution. In October 1915, after the sinking of the Lusitania by a German U-boat, the United States joined half a dozen Latin American countries in informally recognising Carranza. In an early, cynical version of self-determination, Wilson threw up his hands : 'If the Mexicans want to raise hell, let them raise hell. We have nothing to do with it. It is their government, it is their hell 56 .' One month before Munro 1980 , 311. 54. Langley 2002 Tuchman 1958 . 55. Rosenberg 1987 , 7-10, 118. 56. Schoultz 1998 the US war declaration, the de jure recognition of Carranza was complete 57 , but after 1917, when he shepherded the approval of a constitution that awarded all subsoil rights to the Mexican people and not to foreign investors, some in the United States panicked. The Oil Producers Association and National Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico put pressure on the State Department, and Senator Albert Fall of New Mexico held hearings in August 1919. Suggestions from these proponents of US investment included breaking relations with Carranza so as to encourage arms to fl ow and a rebellion to spark, or even sending another US intervention force into Mexico. Wilson and Lansing refused 58 . The second way that the war restrained US empire in the Americas was by spreading the idea of self-determination, a concept that seemed to many to be contradicted by US actions. To those under occupation, self-determination was an obvious goal. Even Latin Americans who did not suffer intervention or occupation were embittered, and many said so when they met US counterparts. The war also created a powerful antiimperialist minority in the United States, much of it an extension of isolationism 59 . Of greatest consequence was that the end of the war did not immediately end any occupation, which laid bare other, non-strategic reasons for the US presence, such as commercial profi t and social engineering.
The message of self-government affected most deeply those to whom US imperial control denied self-government. Latin Americans saw the end of the war as an opportunity to exploit the paradox embedded in Wilson's global foreign policy ideology : the US president fought a 'war to end all wars' and helped imperial allies with a promise to spread 'selfdetermination.' As Erez Manela has shown, it soon became clear to nationalists and anti-colonialists outside Europe that they were not to be the benefi ciaries of Wilson's self-determination 60 . Latin Americans, like others around the world, did not accede so easily to the US implication that freedom was not for them. Though occupied, Haiti was nominally independent, and so sent diplomats and delegates abroad. Usually these were puppets of the pro-occupation presidents, but there was one exception. Dantès Bellegarde, an experienced statesman and educator, was sent to various European capitals by Port-au-Prince. Often against the wishes of his own government, he argued for the rights of other small nations or those of Haitians exploited for their labour in Cuba
61
. On 1 July 1924, Bellegarde, then president of the Haitian League Society, a private association, made his most impassioned speech to the International Federation of League Societies in Lyon. For this pacifi st organisation Bellegarde embraced the language of 'international law' to denounce US occupation. US diplomats, attending only as observers at the General Assembly in Geneva, barely succeeded 57. Ibid., 251. 58. Machado, Jr. and Judge 1970 ; Trow 1971 ; Langley 2003, 107 ; Rosenberg 1987 , 116-17. 59. Schoultz 1998 , 253. 60. Manela 2007 . 61. Cook 1940 in having a simultaneous resolution in favour of US withdrawal watered down enough to be innocuous 62 . Dominicans were even more emboldened by the rhetoric at Versailles -and more desperate. In 1916, the US occupation had pushed their president, Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, into exile. It simultaneously installed a military government that operated like a dictatorship -with no Dominican president or legislature, and a US Marine as military governor ruling by decree -thus making it impossible for Dominicans to represent their nation abroad, in contrast to Haiti. Henríquez y Carvajal -known as 'Don Pancho' -lay low for a few years, but when the war drew to a close he saw an opportunity in Wilson's hypocrisy. ' How will President Wilson, after having proclaimed ... the rights of small nationalities, allow that not in Europe but in his own continent there exists a small nation to which his own government has denied the liberty and sovereignty that he ... brought to small European nations ?
Roig specifi ed that Caribbean nations should be self-interested in their defence of the Dominican Republic, since the rights of all small nations close to the United States were similar 76 . Henríquez y Carvajal used the remainder of his time in Paris to lobby fellow Latin Americans, and there got the idea of a commission to rally support in South America, an idea that came to fruition in 1920 77 . He also returned to form the Dominican National Commission in New York City, which for the rest of the occupation was instrumental in raising funds and not a little hell 78 . In the years that followed the war, Dominican and Haitian activists compared themselves to Poland and other down-trodden nations and repeatedly pointed out Wilson's hypocrisy 79 .
The issue of self-determination eventually made its way into negotiations between Dominicans and US diplomats in the 1920s. At one meeting with Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, the American Federation of Labor's President, Samuel Gompers, argued in favour of Dominicans, telling Daniels that the issue of Dominican improvement through US tutelage was irrelevant. 'They have the right to self-determination,' Gompers insisted 80 . Early on, it dawned on US occupiers that contradictions abounded between their stated policies in Europe and their actions in Latin America. In March 1919, after meeting with the Haitian minister in Paris, the American mission cautioned Washington that it could not 'continue the occupation in the present form, without subjecting the United States to much criticism, particularly, as the rights of smaller nations are being kept to the fore and in the light of the President's utterances 81 .' Yet it took a new generation of policy-makers in Washington fi nally to respond to entreaties in favour of Latin American self-determination. At the conclusion of the war in Europe, several long-serving and senior State Department offi cials resigned, and a new leadership emerged. In Latin American affairs, Leo Rowe and Sumner Welles rose to the top and began to initiate military withdrawals 82 . In 1922, Welles negotiated the end of the Dominican intervention. Simultaneously, the United States re-organised the Haitian occupation, and oversaw elections in Nicaragua as a prelude to withdrawing its troops. The last two occupations lasted several more years, but an impetus toward ending them had resulted from the war in Europe.
As the eminent historian Lester Langley stated :
'World War I confi rmed US power in Central America and the Caribbean and increased its infl uence in South America and Canada. No European power, certainly not Germany or even Great Britain, now challenged the United States in the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico 83 . ' Langley, of course, was right that Washington no longer feared challenges from Europeans. But Latin Americans were another matter altogether. True, they were now more closely dependent on the United States, and many in Latin America would embrace the commercial and diplomatic opportunities of that dependence. Yet those who sought independence, often unconditionally, saw that the war served as an occasion to doubt forever the promises emerging from the Colossus of the North, knowing that behind many of those kind words were often the actions of just another imperial power.
